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Abstract
This research examines the extent to which people may be free to make choices by testing their consistency in choosing risk
options. In two experiments, participants were instructed to make the ‘‘same’’ type of risk decisions repeatedly. Experiment
1 showed that when the information for decision is positively framed in terms of gain, the participant’s choice in a particular
decision could not be predicted by his or her choice in another decision (R2s,.02). Experiment 2 showed a statistically
significant predictability when the information is negatively framed in terms of loss, although the predictability was still very
low (R2s,.07). These findings indicate the existence of a large room of variations in which a person may freely choose.
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Introduction
Scientific studies of human choice behaviors are paradoxical.
On the one hand, scientists identify systematic patterns and
regularities of choice behavior [1,2]. On the other hand, if choice
behavior is determined by these patterns and regularities, a choice
will no longer be a choice because people ‘‘respond to’’ but do not
‘‘choose’’ it. This paradox stems from a more fundamental debate
between determinism versus free will: whether human behavior is
determined and automatic [3–5], or whether people are the sole
agents who exercise control on at least some of their behaviors [6–
9]. As an attempt to address this controversy, the present report
describes two experiments that provide some empirical evidence
that choice behavior may not be completely predictable,
suggesting the possible existence of free will.
Foundation of Testing Free Will
Scientists from multiple disciplines have shown interest in
designing methods for testing whether or not people possess their
own freedom to make choices [3,10–12]. Despite considerable
debates and controversies, a foundation emerges that involves the
following set of propositions. First, free will is generally defined as
something that ‘‘we could often have done otherwise than we in
fact did’’ [13] or ‘‘could have done otherwise’’ [14]. This definition
implies that at least certain human behaviors are not pre-
determined, and that behavior is ‘‘more than the unavoidable
consequences of genetic and environmental history of individual
and possible stochastic laws of nature’’ ([4], p. 4500). Specifically,
after a person has made a choice, if he or she is allowed to return
to the moment right before making the decision, and if everything
else is exactly identical to the previous decisional context, free will
is evident when the person is able to make a different choice.
Second, based on the above understanding, to allow freedom,
some physical and behavioral components cannot be summarized
nor predicted by rules and laws. In the physical world, quantum
physics offers a possible way for delineating the unpredictability of
physical nature [15]. Similarly, the prerequisite of free will is that
certain behaviors should contain some degree of unpredictable
variability [6,8].
It is important to note that our goal of this research is not to
confirm the existence of free will. Our goal is to provide some
evidence for the necessary, but not sufficient, room for the
existence of free will. Demonstrating the unpredictability of
behavioral variability does not necessarily reveal the existence of
free will because such unpredictability may be due to a number of
factors, such as randomness,variability in information sampling
but not responding (e.g., as what the signal detection theory tells
us), and/or other hidden factors [4]. Nonetheless, showing the
unpredictability of behaviors is the necessary (though insufficient)
condition for the existence of free will [4]. Unpredictability is the
necessary evidence because it is the only part that distinguishes
determinism from non-determinisms. Unpredictability is not the
sufficient evidence because there could be unobserved factors
contributing to the unpredictability.
Free Will in Invertebrates
Brembs [8] reviewed a body of literature on invertebrates that
supports the notion that invertebrate behavior is sufficiently
unpredictable, fulfilling the prerequisite of freedom to choose their
behavior. Studies on the variations of Drosophila behaviors [16–18]
are of particular relevance to the present research. In the
description of his well-known phototaxis experiments, Benzer
observed that
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 February 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 2 | e56811
‘‘…if you put flies at one end of a tube and a light at the
other end, the flies will run to the light. But I noticed that
not every fly will run every time. If you separate the ones
that ran or did not run and test them again, you find, again,
the same percentage will run. But an individual fly will make
its own decision.’’ (cited from [8], p. 934)
These findings indicate that although the light determines how
likely each fly will move toward the light, each fly might still have
some freedom to choose to fly or to stay. Otherwise, if each fly’s
choice to move is determined by environmental and genetic
factors, the flies that choose to move in a previous trial should
choose to move again, and the flies that choose to stay should
choose to stay again.
A later study by Quinn et al. [17] obtained a similar pattern of
results. A group of flies learned to avoid one of two odors. In the
first trial, the flies were tested with an odor. A certain percentage
of the flies avoided the odor, but the remaining did not. The flies
were then separated into two groups: the avoider group and the
non-avoider group. In the second trial, these two groups were
tested with the same odor again. A certain percentage of flies from
the avoider group and a certain percentage of flies from the non-
avoider group avoided the odor. Interestingly, the percentage of
the avoiders in the two groups was roughly similar, which also
approximated the proportion of the two groups in the first trial.
Although learning about the odor determines how likely each fly
will avoid the odor, each fly may still have some freedom to choose
to avoid the odor or not. If the flies could not have done otherwise,
each fly’s first choice should reliably predict its second choice.
The Present Study
Following the rationale of the aforementioned studies on
Drosophila, we examine the extent to which human choice behavior
involves variability as the prerequisite of free will. In the two
experiments, we instructed participants to make the ‘‘same’’ type
of decisions repeatedly. The decisions are adapted from Tversky
and Kahneman’s vignettes [2] in which the participant is asked to
choose either a decision with a certainly less attractive outcome or
an uncertainly more attractive outcome. When making this kind of
decisions, robust findings revealed that people are generally risk
averse when the vignettes are described in terms of gain (i.e.,
favoring ‘‘a certain gain of $50’’ to ‘‘a 50% chance of gaining $
100 and a 50% chance of gaining nothing’’), and that they are
generally risk seeking when the vignettes are described in terms of
loss (i.e., favoring ‘‘a 50% chance of losing $100 and a 50% chance
of losing nothing’’ to ‘‘a certain loss of $50’’).
If human choice behavior is largely determined, a person who
chooses a ‘‘risky’’ option in one trial is likely to choose the ‘‘risky’’
option again in the other trial. On the other hand, if the person
could have done otherwise, the person’s choice made in a
particular trial may not be predicted by his or her choice in
another trial.
Ethics. We declare that individual participants in the current
study (Experiments 1 and 2) gave their written informed consent.




In Experiment 1, participants (N=105) were asked to make a
series of choices as if they were making it for real. They made two
monetary decisions that were separated by a medical decision (see
below), with the order of the two monetary decisions counterbal-
anced across participants. As the participants were residing in
Hong Kong, we changed the currency to Hong Kong dollars in
the monetary decisions so that participants were more familiar
with the context of these decisions. The percentage of participants
who made each choice is presented in square brackets, and the
results are consistent with those of previous studies in showing that
participants generally prefer the ‘‘risk averse’’ to the ‘‘risky’’
choices.
(1) Positive monetary decision 1 (+Mon1), adapted from Tversky
and Kahneman’s [2] Problem 3i.
Choose between:
A. A sure gain of HK$240 (66.04%)
B. 25% chance to gain HK$1,000, and
75% chance to gain nothing (33.96%)
(2) Positive monetary decision 2 (+Mon2), adapted from Tversky
and Kahneman’s [2] Problem 5.
Choose between:
Table 1. Results from Positively Framed Vignettes (crossing +Mon1 and +Mon2) in Experiment 1.
+Mon1 ‘‘Risk Averse’’ Choice +Mon1 ‘‘Risky’’ Choice
+Mon2 ‘‘Risk Averse’’
Choice +Mon2 ‘‘Risky’’ Choice
+Mon2 ‘‘Risk Averse’’
Choice +Mon2 ‘‘Risky’’ Choice
Number of participants 39 30 19 17
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0056811.t001
Table 2. Results from Positively Framed Vignettes (crossing +Mon1 and +Med1) in Experiment 1.
+Mon1 ‘‘Risk Averse’’ Choice +Mon1 ‘‘Risky’’ Choice
+Med1 ‘‘Risk Averse’’
Choice +Med1 ‘‘Risky’’ Choice
+Med1 ‘‘Risk Averse’’
Choice +Med1 ‘‘Risky’’ Choice
Number of participants 44 25 19 17
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0056811.t002
Unpredictability in Individuals’ Risk Decisions
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 February 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 2 | e56811
A. A sure win of HK$30 (55.66%)
B. 80% chance to win HK$45 (44.34%)
(3) Positive medical decision (+Med 1), adapted from Tversky
and Kahneman’s [2] Problem 1.
Choose between:
A. 200 people will be saved (60.38%)
B. 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3
probability that no people will be saved (39.62%)
Results and Discussion
We first analyzed the responses of the two monetary decisions
(see Table 1). Among 66% (69 out of 105) of participants who
chose the ‘‘risk averse’’ option in +Mon1, 57% (39 out of 69) chose
the ‘‘risk averse’’ option again in +Mon2. Among 34% (36 out of
105) who chose the ‘‘risky’’ option in +Mon1, 53% (19 out of 36)
chose the ‘‘risk averse’’ option in +Mon2. The percentages of
choosing the ‘‘risk averse’’ option from the two groups of
participants (i.e., 57% and 53%) were very close to the 56% (58
out of 105) of the overall percentage of the sample. These results
indicate that a person’s choice of risk in one decision may not
always predict his or her risk preference in another decision.
Importantly, logistic regression showed that responses in +Mon1
accounted for 0% variance of responses in +Mon2, Nagelkerke
R2= .00, x2 = .13, p= .71.
The above analysis tests the prediction from free will by testing a
null hypothesis, which is logically not able to be confirmed.
Alternatively, the findings could be analyzed from a perspective in
which the prediction of complete determinism to be the null
hypothesis and the free will prediction to be the alternative
hypothesis. That is, a complete determinism suggests that people
should exhibit 100% consistency between their responses in
+Mon1 and +Mon2. Our results showed that only 55.24% (58 out
of 105) showed this consistency, which is significantly smaller than
100%. A Chi square test that corrected the expected frequency of
100% to be including at least a cell with expected frequency of 5
(i.e., 100 vs. 5) was significant, x2(1) = 370.44, p,.0001.
There was an issue of individual difference in terms of risk
attitude that might complicate the interpretations of our findings.
It is noteworthy that because the +Mon1 and +Mon2 were not
identical, one problem might promote risk taking more than might
the other problem. Therefore, it was possible that individuals with
a different risk attitude (e.g., with some specific values on
parameters of risk taking or risk aversion coefficients) would
exhibit different preferences for the two problems, resulting in the
unpredictability between +Mon1 and +Mon2. If the unpredict-
ability was primarily due to this individual difference, then it
means that the participants’ choice behaviors could still be
predictable.
We checked this possibility with the following logic. Assume that
one problem is more risk promoting than the other one, if
participants’ risk preference is determined and hence showing
consistency in their risk preference, then a couple of observations
are expected. First, those who choose the risky option in the less
risk promoting problem should be determined to choose the risky
option in the more risk promoting problem, regardless of their risk
attitude. Second, those who choose the risk averse option in the
more risk promoting problem should be determined to choose the
risk aversion option in the less risk promoting problem, again
regardless of their risk attitude. We conducted the following
analyses to examine these possibilities.
Assume that, due to whatever reasons, +Mon1 was more risk
promoting than +Mon2. Those who were risk averse in +Mon1
were those who were very conservative. These participants should
also be risk averse in +Mon2. There were 65.71% of participants
(69 out of 105) who took the risk averse option in +Mon1. Among
these 69 participants, 56.52% of participants (39 out of 69) took
the risk averse option for +Mon2. The 56.52% of consistency was
not significantly different from the 65.71% of the response
distribution in +Mon1, x2(1) = 2.59, p..05, but was significantly
different from 100%, corrected x2(1) = 134.77, p,.0001. In
addition, those who were risk taking in +Mon2 should also be
risk taking in +Mon1. There were 44.76% (47 out of 105) who
took the risk option in +Mon2. Among them 36.17% (17 out of 47)
took the risk option in +Mon1, which was not different from
44.76%, x2(1) = 1.40, p..05, but was significantly different from
100%, corrected x2(1) = 32.23, p,.0001.
Conversely, assume that, due to whatever reasons, +Mon2 was
more risk promoting than +Mon1. Those who were risk averse in
+Mon2 were those who were very conservative. These participants
should also be risk averse in +Mon1. There were 55.24% of
participants (58 out of 105) who took the risk averse option for
Table 3. Results from Positively Framed Vignettes (crossing +Mon2 and +Med1) in Experiment 1.
+Mon2 ‘‘Risk Averse’’ Choice +Mon2 ‘‘Risky’’ Choice
+Med 1 ‘‘Risk Averse’’
Choice +Med 1 ‘‘Risky’’ Choice
+Med 1 ‘‘Risk Averse’’
Choice +Med 1 ‘‘Risky’’ Choice
Number of participants 37 21 26 21
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0056811.t003
Table 4. Results from Positively Framed Vignettes (crossing -Mon1 and -Mon2) in Experiment 2.
2Mon1 ‘‘Risk Averse’’ Choice 2Mon1 ‘‘Risky’’ Choice
2Mon2 ‘‘Risk Averse’’
Choice 2Mon2 ‘‘Risky’’ Choice
2Mon2 ‘‘Risk Averse’’
Choice 2Mon2 ‘‘Risky’’ Choice
Number of participants 11 6 28 51
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0056811.t004
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+Mon2. Among these 58 participants, 67% (39 out of 58) took the
risk averse option for +Mon1, which was not significantly different
from 55.24%, x2(1) = 2.97, p..05, but was significantly different
from 100%, corrected x2(1) = 42.90, p,.0001. In addition, those
who were risk taking in +Mon1 should also be risk taking in
+Mon2. There were 34.29% (36 out of 105) took the risk option in
+Mon1. Among them 47% (17 out of 36) took the risk option in
+Mon2, which was not significantly different from 34.29%,
x2(1) = 2.67, p..05, but was significantly different from 100%,
corrected Chi = 33.45, p,.0001.
Finally, we also analyzed the predictability between +Mon1 and
+Med1 (see Table 2) and between +Mon2 and +Med1 (Table 3).
For +Mon1 predicting +Med1, logistic regression showed a non-
significant Nagelkerke R2= .02, x2 = 1.18, p= .28. For +Mon2
predicting +Med1, logistic regression also showed a non-significant
Nagelkerke R2= .01, x2 = .78, p= .38.
In summary, results from Experiment 1 indicate that when
information is positively framed, people’s risk preference in a
decision does not predict their preference in another highly similar
decision. These findings resemble the Drosophila’s behaviors
demonstrated by previous studies [16,17], suggesting that although
the positively framed information and people’s genetic component
jointly determine the probability of their choice behavior, people
seem to freely determine their choices.
Experiment 2
Methods and Materials
The design of Experiment 2 (N=96) was identical to that of
Experiment 1, except that all the vignettes were negatively framed
(i.e., described in terms of loss). The percentage of participants
who chose each option is presented in square brackets; the results
indicate that people generally prefer ‘‘risk’’ to ‘‘risk averse’’
options.
(1) Negative monetary decision 1 (-Mon1), adapted from Tversky
and Kahneman’s [2] Problem 3ii.
Choose between:
A. A sure loss of HK$750 (17.71%)
B. 25% chance to lose HK$1,000, and 75% chance to lose
nothing (82.29%)
(2) Negative monetary decision 2 (-Mon2), modified from
Tversky and Kahneman’s [2] Problem 5.
Choose between:
A. A sure loss of HK$30 (40.63%)
B. 80% chance to lose HK$45 (59.38%)
(3) Negative medical decision (-Med 1), adapted from Tversky
and Kahneman’s [2] Problem 2.
Choose between:
A. 400 people will die (21.88%)
B. 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability
that 600 people will die. (78.13%)
Results and Discussion
As done previously, we first analyzed the responses of the two
monetary decisions (see Table 4). Among 18% (17 out of 96) of
participants who chose the ‘‘risk averse’’ option in -Mon1, 65% (11
out of 17) chose the ‘‘risk averse’’ option again in -Mon2. Among
82% (79 out of 96) who chose the ‘‘risky’’ option in -Mon1, 35%
(28 out of 79) chose the ‘‘risk averse’’ option in -Mon2. The
percentages of choosing the ‘‘risk averse’’ option from the two
groups of participants (i.e., 35% and 65%) were not that close to
the 59% (57 out of 96) of the overall percentage of the entire
sample. Such results indicate that a person’s choice of risk cannot
predict his or her risk preference in another decision. Logistic
regression showed that responses in -Mon1 significantly accounted
for 7% variance of responses in -Mon2, Nagelkerke R2= .07,
x2 = 4.89, p= .03. Furthermore, there were 60.42% of participants
(58 out of 96) showed consistent preference between –Mon1 and –
Mon2, which is significantly fewer than 100%, corrected
x2(1) = 381.77, p,.0001.
Next, we checked the issue of individual differences. Assume
that, due to whatever reasons, -Mon1 was more risk promoting
than -Mon2. Those who are risk averse in -Mon1 were those who
were very conservative. That means, these participants should also
be risk averse in -Mon2. There were 17.71% of participants (17
out of 96) took the risk averse option for -Mon1. Among these 17
participants 35.29% (6 out of 17) took the risk averse option for -
Mon2., which was not significantly different from 17.71%,
Table 5. Results from Positively Framed Vignettes (crossing -Mon1 and –Med1) in Experiment 2.
2Mon1 ‘‘Risk Averse’’ Choice 2Mon1 ‘‘Risky’’ Choice
2Med1 ‘‘Risk Averse’’
Choice 2Med1 ‘‘Risky’’ Choice
2Med1 ‘‘Risk Averse’’
Choice 2Med1 ‘‘Risky’’ Choice
Number of participants 6 11 15 64
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0056811.t005
Table 6. Results from Positively Framed Vignettes (crossing –Mon2 and –Med1) in Experiment 2.
2Mon2 ‘‘Risk Averse’’ Choice 2Mon2 ‘‘Risky’’ Choice
2Med 1 ‘‘Risk Averse’’
Choice 2Med 1 ‘‘Risky’’ Choice
2Med 1 ‘‘Risk Averse’’
Choice 2Med 1 ‘‘Risky’’ Choice
Number of participants 11 28 10 47
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0056811.t006
Unpredictability in Individuals’ Risk Decisions
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 February 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 2 | e56811
x2(1) = 3.61, p..05. We could not examine whether it was
significantly different from 100% because the number of cases
was too few. In addition, those who were risk taking in -Mon1
should also be risk taking in -Mon2. There were 82.29% (79 out of
96) took the risk option in -Mon1. Among them 64.56% (51 out of
79) took the risk option in –Mon2, which was significantly fewer
than 82.29%, x2(1) = 17.04, p,.01, and was also significantly fewer
than 100%, corrected x2(1) = 112.95, p,.0001.
Conversely, assume that, due to whatever reasons, -Mon2 was
more risk promoting than –Mon1. Those who were risk averse in -
Mon2 were those who very conservative. That means, these
participants should also be risk averse in -Mon1. There were
40.63% of participants (39 out of 96) took the risk averse option for
-Mon2. Among these 39 participants 28.21% (11 out of 39) took
the risk averse option for -Mon1, which was not significantly
different from 40.63%, x2(1) = 2.39, p..05, but was significantly
fewer than 100%, corrected x2(1) = 8.26, p,.0001. In addition,
those who were risk taking in -Mon2 should also be risk taking in -
Mon1. There were 59.38% (57 out of 96) took the risky option in -
Mon2. Among them 89.47% (51 out of 57) took the risk option for
-Mon1, which was significant more than 59.38%, x2(1) = 21.40,
p,.0001, but was not significantly fewer than 100%, corrected
x2(1) = .22, p..05.
Finally, we also analyzed the predictability between -Mon1 and
-Med1 (see Table 5) as well as between -Mon2 and -Med1
(Table 6). Logistic regression for -Mon1 predicting -Med1 showed
a non-significant Nagelkerke R2= .03, x2 = 1.99, p= .16. Logistic
regression for +Mon2 predicting +Med1 also showed a non-
significant Nagelkerke R2= .02, x2 = 1.52, p= .22.
In summary, results from Experiment 2 indicate that when
information is negatively (vs. positively) framed, people exhibit a
more consistent risk preference across different risk decisions.
However, the predictability from a person’s response in one
decision to another decision is very low. The greatest predictability
has been observed between -Mon1 and -Mon2, in which only 7%
of variances are shared. Also, the analyses of the issue of individual
difference showed no evidence of determinism, except that if –
Mon2 was more risk promoting than –Mon1, those who took the
risky option in –Mon2 were consistently took the risky option in –
Mon1. Thus, although the result is not as extreme as that of
Experiment 1, a person’s risk preference in negatively framed
conditions is still characterized by substantial variations.
Conclusions
In this research, we pose a question that explores the extent to
which a person’s choice could be a (free) choice. Replicating the
findings of Tversky and Kahneman, people’s choice behavior is
largely determined by how information is framed: the tendency to
be risk averse in positively framed situations, and the tendency to
be risk seeking in negatively framed situations. This research
extended the body of classic studies by testing how likely people
exhibit the same risk preference across different situations with
similar risk implications. Consistent with previous research on
Drosophila, the present study reveals that all personal and
situational factors determine only the probability of choice
behaviors, and a large room of variations exists in which a person
may freely choose.
As stated in the Introduction, demonstrating the presence of
variations does not indicate the existence of free will because
randomness can also produce the same variations [8]. Some
scholars doubt that separating randomness effects from free will
effects is a scientific research topic [4]. Nonetheless, this variation
indicates the existence of a considerable room of variations that
may allow a person to have free will in their choice behaviors.
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